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In the

-SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
FLORA H. ·.:McKENZIE, wido'v of
~~n

McKenzie, deceased,
Plaintiff,

' vs.

·t~JIE·INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

OF UTAH, HAROLD J. WHITING,
'V/. ·VERL WHITING ~and J. MEL.:
\TIN HAYMOND, doing business as

Case No.
7259

WHITING. and HAYMOND, Contractors,_ and WESTERN 'NA'TIONAL INDEMNITY COMPANY,
·a oorpora.tion,
Defetn&a;nts.

'PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF

McKAY, BURTON, NIELSEN
AND RICHARDS,
At·torneys for Plaintiff..
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In the

SUPREME COURT
.l

.l

of the

STATE OF UTAH
FLORA H. 1IeKENZIE, widow of
Owen MeKenzie, decHa:sed,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, HAROLD J. WHITING,
W. VERL WHITING and J. MELYIN HAYl\IOND, doing business as
WHITING and HAYMOND, Contractors, and WESTERN NATIONAL INDEMNITY COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendants.
1

Case No.
7259

......\

J!

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF

)

)

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
Thi'S action has been brought for the purpo'se of having this Court review an order of the Industrial CommisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sion of Utah denying the plaintiff death benefits on account of the death of her husband Owen McKenzie.
Plaintiff is. the surviving widow and was dependent upon
Mr. McKenzie for her support prior to his de'ath.
The defendants Harold J. Whiting, W. Veri Whiting
and J. Melvin Haymond are co-partners doing business
under the name and style of Whiting and Haymond, Contractors, engaged in 'the business of general contracting
and construction work, with their principal place of business located a;t Springville, Utah, where the deceased
resided prior to his. death.
Mr. McKenzie died on December 6, 1947, as a result
of injuries received in an automobile 'accident on November 29, 1947. The accident occurred at the intersection
of Fifth Eas't and Thirty-ninth South Streets, in Salt
Lake County, Utah, while decedent was riding in an automobile owned by Whiting and Haymond (hereinafter referred to as the "Company"), and being operated by J.
M. Cranmer, the Company superintendent. The automobile was being operated at Company expense and waR
being used for 'the purpose of bringing Mr. Cranmer,
.Mr. McKenzie and others from Garland, Utah, to their
respective homes in Springvine, Uta:h.
On May 25, 1948 the plaintiff filed her application
for death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation
Law. Thereafter a hearing was held on the lOth day of
August, 1948, at Provo, Utah.

On August 24, 1948, the

Com1nission rendered its decision, in which it found that
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the accident did no't arise out of or in the course of the
employment of the deceased by the defendant Company.
On September 22, 19±8, a petition for rehearing was
filed, setting forth several grounds of error, which said
petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on October
5, 1948, in consequence of which plaintiff, on the 4th day
of November, 1948, filed her peti'tion in this court seeking a review of the C01nnrission 's order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
There is very little, if any, material conflict in the
evidence as to the facts. The evidence discloses that the
deceased, Owen McKenzie had worked for 1:he Company
since about 1942; that his position during that time was
either as foreman or construction superintendent (R. 19).
The superintendent of construction is the person who has
immediate charge of a particular construction job, while
the foreman is the person worh-ing immediate1y under the
superintendent (R. 21, 32). At the time of the accident,
and for approxin1ately 'three 1nonths prior thereto, Mr.
McKenzie had been working on a construction job near
Garland, Utah, referred to in the record as the" Garland
job". His work had been that of grade foreman under
Mr. J. M. Craniner, who was the superintendent in
charge (R. 8, 30). Prior to the Garland job Mr. McKenzie had been employed at :Malad, Idaho, where he was
superintendent in charge and Mr. Cranmer was employed
as foreman under him. (R. 3).
The superintendent in charge of construction wa:;:
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always furnished a pick-up truck by the Company for his
use on the job (R. p. 34). As stated by Mr. Harold J.
Whiting, one of the partners, "We furnish a pick-up
truck on each job that the superintendent has charge of
and is used for bringing parts back and forth from Salt
Lake or Springville or any o't:her place." (R. 78) He
further testified that the pick-up truck is under the control and supervision of the superintendent, and that Mr.
Cranmer was not given any orders as to what particular
use he i:lhould make of the truck. As a mat'ter of fact, it
was 'left up to the ''discretion of the general superintendE'nt as to how he used that pick-up" (R. 85 ).
At times, when Mr. McKenzie was working on jobs
where it was possible, he came home every week-end.
"\Vhile he was the superintendent he came home on Saturday af'ternoons in the pick-up truck, which was either
left at his residence or was taken down to the Company
shops in Springville (R. 9, 11, 19, 20, 23). Occasionally
it was necessary for him to pick up parts or to have the
truck serviced. (R. 15, 28) On both the Garland and
Malad jobs ~Ir. McKenzie had come home ,every week-end
in the pick-up truck (R. 10, 11, 22, 23, 31), with the exception of one occasion, when he came hmne from the
Garland job with a :Mr. Harwood (R. 20, 24). On the
smne occasion Mr. Cranmer and others rode with Mr.
Fullmer, because "there were so many men to come
down." (R. 35)
Prior to working at Malad, .Mr. l\fcKenzie had
worked at Boise, Idaho. While working on this job he
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did not come home every week-€nd because it was too
far (R. 14), but he was taken to 'the job by company
transportation, and on one occasion was brought home
in a Company car (R. 12). Thereafter, when he returned
to Boise, the Company furnished his transportation on
the train ( R. 13, 24) .
Mr. McKenzie usuafiy had someone else drive the
pick-up truck for him while he was superintendent (R.
20). On the :Malad job Mr. Cranmer had frequently
driven the car for Mr. McKenzie, and went with the
superintendent when he made trips (R. 50). Mr. Cranmer testified that it was the custom and practice for him
to ride with ~ir. :McKenzie when the latter was superintendent, and that this same practice was followed when
Mr. Cranmer became superintendent and Mr. McKenzie
acted as foreman (R. 51). As a matter of fact, Mr. McKenzie always rode with Mr. Cranmer while on the Garland job with the exception of the one week-end previously indicated (R. 52).
1

l't was also testified that other employees front
Springville had their ears at Garland and drove to and
from the place of mnp1oyment, going home on week-ends
(R. 26, 42). With respect to such employees the Company did not furnish any gasoline or otherwise pay the
expenses of transportation (R. 43, 58). But if there was
no way for the1n to get hmne, they would ride in 'the pickup (R. 49). There were also a number of men employed
at Garland from other towns, including Logan and
:l\falad. These men abo used their own means of transSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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portation to and from work (R. 65, 71, 76).
The Company maintained living quarters for the
men at the place of employment and also opera!ted a cook
house where its employees w.ere permitted to eat during
the week (although 'the employees paid for their meals)
( R. 33, 45). However, it was not the policy of the company
to leave its employees on the job for the week-end (R. 51,
67), except for one person who was left to look after the
equipment. On such week-ends no facilities were available for eating, so that the person was required to go to
the nearest community (R. 32, 33, 61, 63).
The operations of the Company usually ceased on
Saturday afternoon around two o'clock. All of the employees, including the foreman and superintenden't, were
paid on an hourly rate, and their pay ceased at the time
they stopped work (R. 79). On the day of the accident
the men ceased work at approximately 2 o'clock P.M.
~ir. Harold Whiting was present on the job with the
Studebaker automobile, and because he desired to use
the pick-up truck, he advised ~ir. Cranmer to take the
Studebaker in order to go home (R. 34). Mr. Cranmer
further stated that it was ·because he and Mr. :McKenzie
wanted a ride that Mr. Whiting authorized them to take
the car in order to bring the fellows that were there home
(R. 37). :Jfr. Whiting advised another of the employees
CMr. Arthur C. Fryer) that the car was going home, and
asked hnn if he did not wan't to go along. At that time
Mr. 'Vhiting stated that he needed the pick-up, so that
::\lr. Cranmer was going to take the Studebaker (R. 59).
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:Mr. Whiting also testified that the superintendent on
the job had the use of the pick-up truck; that he knew
it was being used for the purpose of bringing en1ployees
to Springville and return then1 to the job, and that such
action 1net "ith his approval (R. 91, 92). It was also
further stated by ~Ir. Cranmer that the purpose for
which he had the truck was ''hauling 'things around,
back and forth, and taking men back to work and bringing
them home, and any break-down we had, to hau'l things.''
(R. 32).
On the afternoon in question the men ceased work
about 2 o'clock P.M., at which time Mr. Cranmer was
advised by :Mr. Whiting to take the Studebaker automobile ra!ther than the pick-up truck. In addition to
Mr. Cranmer and Mr. McKenzie, Mr. Arthur Fryer, Mr.
Clarence Shoell, ~Ir. Lee Taylor and another man rode
in the automobile. In driving through Salt Lake City,
:Nir. Cranmer drove to Fifth East and Twenty-first
South, where one person left the automobile. Thereafter, Mr. Crann1er turned South on Fifth East and
drove 'to Thirty-ninth South, \vhere the accident occurred
at the intersection of Fifth East and Thirty-ninth South.
There a traffic semaphore signal was operating, evidencing a red signal for traffic approaching from the north.
Mr. Cranmer failed to stop and proceeded into the intersection, where the au'ton1obile collided with a Buick automobile being operated eastwardly on Thirty-ninth 'South
Street. The in1pact occurred over the right front door
on the side where 1\fr. l'vicKenzie was seated, thereby
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crushing him between the cars and causing him injuries
from which he later died.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR.
Plaintiff's pet~tion herein sets forth as alleged error
on the part of the Industrial Commission the following:
1. The Commision erred in finding that the deceased ''of his own volition and initiative elected to leave
his place of employment and go to his home in Springville, Utah, over the week-end; that he obtained permission to ride to his home in Springville, Utah, in a Company-owned car, driven by Mr. J. M. Cranmer, superintendent of construction for the Company.''
2. The Commission erred in finding ''that the injury did not arise out of or in the course of" decedent's
emp:loyment.
3. The Commission erred in failing to find 'that the
defendant company furnished transportation to the decedent as an incident to and part of decedent's employment with the defendant company.
4. The Commission erred in failing to find that the
injury and subsequent dea!t:h arose out of or in the course
of decedent's employment with the defendant company.
5.

The Com1nission erred in failing to find that

the applicant is entitled to death benefits resulting from
the accidental death of Owen ·McKenzie, dec·eased.
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POINTS RELIED UPON.
For 1the purpose of this brief the foregoing alleged
errors can be grouped into two categories for argument:
1. The evidence is insufficient to support a finding
that the decedent obtained permission to ride in the
company-owned car on the day of the accident.
2. The evidence is undisputed tha!t transportation
to and from Springville, Utah, was furnished by defendant company as an incident of decedent's employment.
ARGUMENT.
I.

THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT DECEDENT OBTAINED
PERMISSION TO RIDE IN DEFENDANT'S AUTOMOBLE.
Nowhere in the record was it stated either by the
individual defendants or by Mr. Cranmer that the decedent at any 1time requested permission to ride home in
the company-owned car. Wbile this point itself is not
con~lusive as to decedent's status at the time the accident
occurred, nevertheless it is evident 'that the Industrial
Commission concluded from the evidence that the accident did not arise out of the couri'le of decedent's employment with the defendant company because of the finding
that he had reques'ted permission to ride in the automobile, and therefore the relationship of en1ployer and
employee could not exist at the time of the accident. It is
plaintiff's contention that if the court should determine
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that the Commission erred in finding that decedent obtained permission to ride in defendant's car on the day
the accident occurred, the decision of 'the Commission
must be reversed for the reason that such finding supports and gives weight to the ultimate finding that the
accident did not arise out of or in ~the course of decedent's
employinent with the defendant company.
As hereinbefore related, Mr. McKenzie and Mr.
Cranmer had worked closely together on this and other
jobs where one had been superintendent and the other
the foreman. According to Mr. Cranmer, it was cus'tom
and practice for him to ride with Mr. 1\:fcKenzie when
the latter was superintendent, and this same custom was
continued on the Garland job, when Mr. Cranmer became
superintendent and Mr. 1[cKenzie acted as foreman (R.
51). The truck was furnished to Mr. Cranmer for the
purpose of ''hauling things around, back and forth, and
taking men back to work and bringing them home.'' (R.
32)

?\lr. Harold Whiting, one of the partners, knew that
the truck was being used for the purpose of bringing employees to Springville and returning them to the job, and
such action met with his approval (R. 91, 92). The company closed up the job on Saturday afternoons and did
not care to have any of the employees remain at the
camp excepting one left to look after the equipment (R.
51, 61). Mr. :McKenzie had ridden home with Mr. CranIner on every week-end when l\f r. Cranmer drove a company vehicle to Springville, and ~[ r. Cranmer had driven
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either the pick-up or the Studebaker home every weekend except one, from the t.hne the Garland job was commenced in September.
In view of this undisputed testimony there appears
to be no basis for the finding made by the Commission
that ~fr. )[cl(enzie voluntarily left the job and obtained
permission to ride home with ~fr. Cranmer in the company-owned \ehicle.

II.
THE EYIDENCE IS UNDISPUTED THAT
TRANSPORTATION TO A.ND. FROM SPRINGVILLE, UTAH, WAS FURNISHED BY DEFENDANT CO~fp ANY AS AN INCIDENT OF DECEDENT'S EMPLOYMENT.
At the outset we are confronted with the general
rule heretofore announced by this Court that an accident
occurring to an employee while traveling to or from
work does not arise out of or in the course of his employment. Thi~ rule, however, is not without exception.
The Supreme Court of the United States in a very early
case arising in this State enunciated the policy to be
followed in deterining the question of liability under
\V. orkmen 's Compensation laws.
In the case of C1tdnhy Packing Co. ·1:. Parr:a:mo're,
263 U. S. 418; 4-l- Sup. Ct. 153; 68 L. Ed. 366; 30 A. L. R.
532, the Cotu't said:
'• The !liability is based, not upon any act or
mnission of the en1ployer, but upon the existence
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of the relationship which the ·employee bears to
the employment because of and in the course of
which he has been injured. And this is no1t to
impose liability upon one person for an injury
sustained by another with which the former has
no ·connection; but it is to say, that it is enough
if there be a causal connection between the injury and the business in which he employs the
latter-a connection substantially contributory,
though it need not be the sole or proximate cause.
Legislation which imposes liability for an injury
thus related to the employment, among other
justifying circumstances, has a tendency to .pronlote a more equitabie dis1tribution of the economic
burdens in cases of personal injury or death resulting from aecidents in the course of industrial
employment, and is a matter of sufficient public ·concern (Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 239, 61 L. Ed. 697, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep.
260, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642, 13 N.C.C.A. 927), to
escape condemnation as arbitrary, capricious, or
clearly unreasonable. Whether a given accident
is so related or incident 1to the business must
depend upon its own particular circumstances.
No exact formula can be ·laid down which will
automatically solve every case. The fact that the
acddent happens upon a pub'Lic road or at a
railroad ·crO'ssing, and that the danger is one to
which the general public is likewise exposed is
not conclusive against the existence of such causal
relationship, if the danger be one to whieh the
employee, by reason of and in connection with his
employment, is subjected peculiarly or to an ahnormal degree.''
In L~amm~ v. Silver Fall's Timber Co., 133 Ore. 468;
286 Pac. 527, the Supreme Court of Oregon said:
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Since the courts have recognized the broad
hlunane purposes of the act, they have readily
pereeived that the mere fact 1that the injury befell
the claiu1ant, at a moment when he was not
performing manual ~:abor for his employer, does
not necessarily prove that the -accident did not
arise out of or in the course of the employment.
The words just mentioned which are a par1t ·of
most of the acts are never qualified by the limitation that the injury must have been inflicted during regular working hours. Honaker & Feeney
v. Hartley, 140 V a. 1, 124 S.E. 220. From Larke
v. John Hancock ~1utual Life Insurance Co., 90
Conn. 303, 97 Atl. 320, 321 L. R. A. 1916E, 584,
\\Te quote: 'The period of employment has sometinles been held to eover a .period other tlran
that for which wages are paid.' And from our
own decision in Wells v. Clark & Wilson Lumber
Co., 114 Or. 297, 235 P. 283, 290, the following i's
taken : 'Yet one may be under such a contract
with another as to be a present emp!loyee, although the actual work incident to the employrnent may not be beglm until a future day.' And
since all workmen's compensation legislation is
noticeably inspired by the English act, the following language quoted from John Stewart & Son
Y. Longhurst (1917) A. C. 249, Ann. Cas. 1917D,
196, is appropria:te: 'It has been established by
a series of decisions that employment for the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1nay
in many cases be regarded as exisiting before the
actual work has ceased.' In other words, the
work rnay suspend and yet the employment continue. \Ve shal1 later refer to two cases which
applied the'se principles in a very practical manner. In the one, the deceased employee had maintained his hmne in ~ orth Dakota, but performed
4

•

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,
14
his. S'ervices in Minnesota. He lost his life while
returning from 'the latter state to his home to
spend the week-end. In the other case, 'a school
teacher was. killed at a railroad crossing while
on her way to attend a teacher's institute. It was
de'sirable that she should attend the institute, but
the law did not make attendance mandatory. In
both cases, the courts heid that the death arose
in an 'accident arising out of and in 'the cours·e
of his employment' and compensation was
ordered.''
In consequence of the foregoing policy it has frequently happened, as stated by the Oregon Supreme
Court in the Lamm case, Supra, that an e1npioyee is
granted compensation ''even though his hours of service
have not yet begun, or have ended, and even though he
is not upon ;the premises of his emp1oyer, engaged in
physical service of the latter.''
One of the earliest exceptions to the general rule
stated above, and which has been generally accepted in
the courts throughout the United States, is 'that where
transportation to or from the place of employment is
furnished by the en1ployer as an incident of the contract
of employment, an aeciden't, occurring while thus travelto or from the place of employment, arises out of or in
the course of such employment.
See, Hwnt·err v. Summerville, 205 Ark. 463; 169 S. W.
(2d) 579 (where a timber contractor acquiesced in the
custom of his employees riding to and frmn the log woods
on one of the trucks of a sub-contractor whose compenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sation wa:~ paid by t:he contractor); Jiminez v. Liberty
Farms Co., 78 Cal. App. (2d) 458; 177 Pac. (2d) 785
(where a farm ernployee was injured while riding on a
truck furnished by the ernployer) ; Wells v. Cutter, 90
Colo. 111; 6 Pac. (2d) 459; Johnso·n v. Weise, 125 Conn.
238; 3 Atl. (2d) 19; 1llyland v. Jlaryland Casualty Co.
(La.) 28 So. (2d) 351 (where the employer furnished
transportation to and from work and charged a small
fee therefor, but which fee was not sufficient to cover
the entire operation cost. In this case the Court stated
that that the faet that 'the employer could have discontinued the service at any time was immaterial) ; Employe.rs R('insura;nce OorporiatiJon v. Jones (Tex.) 195 S. W.
(2d) 810; v·aughn v. St,anaard Sll!rety & Oa.sualty Co.
(Tenn.) 184 ~- W. (2d) 566 (where the company permitted jts employees 'to ride home on con1pany trucks but
did not pay thern for the time involved, and authorized
~uch employees to go home hy any means of transportation they desired); Johnson v. Penwell (Okla.) 175 Pac.
( 2<L) 266 (where the traction con1pany pennitted its emplo~·ee~ to ride the company buses 1:o the place of employment); Pears,on r. Aluminum Company of Ame.rioa
( \Va~l1.) 161 Pae. ( 2d) 169 (where the cornpany furnished
n lm~ to transport its workers to and from the place of
employrnent.)
A good discussion of the poliey involved in such
<'ases i~ found in BlanJ..iin.-.,·hilp Co. v. Bro1cn (Ark.) 208
N. "r· (:2d) 778, and in Industrial Com:mission v. Aetna
!Jifc Ins. Co., 64 Colo. 480; 174 Pac. 589; 3 A.L.R.1336.
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Bradbury on Worlanen's Compensation, 3 Ed., Page
48, states the rule as follows :
"If an employee is conveyed to and from his
_work in a conveyance furnished by the employer,
unde-r an ·express or an implied contract to furnish
such conveyance, ·an injury to an employee while
on the journey, arises out of the employment."
Again in the case of Venho v. Ost.r:ander Ry. &
Timber Co., 185 Wash. 138; 52 Pac. (2d) 1167, the Supreme Court of Washington held:
''When a worlanan is 'SO injured, while being
transported in 'a vehicle furnished by his employer as an incident of the employment, he is
within 'the course of his employment', as contelnp,lated by the act. In other words, when the
vehicle is supplied by the employer for the mutual
benefit of himself and the workman to facilitate
the progress of the work, the employment begins
when the worlanan enters the vehicle and ends
when he leaves it on the termination of his labor.
This exception to the rule may arise either as the
result of custom or contract, ·express or implied.
It may be implied from the nature 'and circumstances of the employment ·and the cus't.onl of the
employer to furnish transportation." (Citing
authorities.)
Nor is it necessary that the employee be subject to
·the employer's control during the journey.
In the recent case of Cardillo v. L~berty Mutual Ins.
Co., 330 U. S. 469; 67 Sup. Ct. 801; 91 L. Ed. 1028, the
Supre1ne Court of the United States held:
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·'The mere fact that at the moment of the
injury, during the journey to or from the work
site, the employee is not actually doing the work
he is prin1arily hired to do, or that his acts 'and
movements are not subject to the emp~oyer's control, does not render him any less in the service
of his employer."
And in the case of Thomas v. Chickasaw Saw Mill,
Inc. (La.), 23 So. (2d) 701, where the plaintiff was injured while riding home from work on a wagon belonging to the defendant company, the Court determined
that a contract for transportation may be implied from
the acts of the employer. In that case, as here, the employer knew that the employees were riding on the
employer's conveyance, which was used in connection
with the business in which he was engaged. The Court
there held:
·'However, the rule wi'th regard to transportation has one well-known modification as
there are several decisions which hold that a contract with necessary transportation may be implied from the acts of the employer who 'tacitly
permits his employee to ride to and from work
on a conveyance used for some purpose in connection with the business in which he is engaged.
See vValker V. .Jiills Engineering Construction
Co., 152 So. 83."
In the case of Konopka v. Jackson County Ro1ad
Commission, 270 Mich. 174; 258 N. W. 429; 97 A. L. R.
;-l;l2, the Court sta!ted the law to be:
''The law se·ems rather definitely settled that
in cases where the contract of employment ex-
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pressly includes conveyance of ·the employee to or
from his place of work, an accident arising out of
such transportation and resuUing in an injury to
the employee is compensable. It is so held because
such an 'accident arises both out of and in the
course of the employment. Shneider's Workmen's
Compensation Law (2d Ed.), S.ec. 265. We think
both on re·ason and on respectable authority the
holding should be the same where, as in this case,
incident to the emp;loyment contraclt it is contemplated and understood by both the employer and
the employee that the former will transport the
latter 'to or from the place where the work is done.
And especially should such be the rule when under
a uniform course of conduct the employer does so
convey the employee. We do not think the legal
aspect is affected by the fact that the employee
may at his option adopt ·other means of conveyance. The arrangement for conveyance of the
ernployee hy the employer, when rrrade, is obviously for their mutual advantage; and from the
inception of the journey the employee in a very
large sense is under the controil of the employer.
Sulrely the safety or the pe.ril of the .iourney is
witMin the C0ntr.ol of the employer. The transportation is such an essential incident of the
employn1ent as to be a par't of it. Hence, if an
accident arises out of the transportation so provided, it is an 'accident arising out of and in the
course of the employment. And under the circumstances presented here, it does not ·seem that a
different legal aspect was presented merely
because the transportation was in a truck owned
and operated by another ·emp~oyee rather than in
a truck belonging to and operated by the employer." (Italics supplied)
1
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In the Konopka case the employee was injured while
riding in a vehicle owned and operated by another employee and at a time when neither party was being paid
for any services by the employer, nor was the employee
paid for the use of his truck in connection with the transportation of other employees. The test is, as stated by
the Court in that case, "whether, under the contract of
employment, construed in the light of all the attendant
circumstances, there is either an express or implied
undertaking by the employer to provide the transportation.''
See also Laudry v. Louisiana Highway Commission,
153 So. 74, where a road crew o:perating road equipment,
which was ordinarily returned to the shops at night,
left the equipment on the highway and caught a ride
home in another conveyance. The Court there held that
the road crew, being usually transported home on the
equipment, were still in the course of their employment
when being transported by another means of conveyance.
See also, Thompson v. Bradford Motor
Freight Line, 148 So. 79; La'tham v. Southern
Fish & Grocery Co., 181 S. E. 640; McGeorge
Corporation v. Industrial Commis'Sion, 180 Okra.
346; 69 Pae. (2d) 320; California Casualty Indenmity Exchange v. Industrial Accident Commission, 21 Cal ( 2d) 461 ; 132 Pac. ( 2d) 815 ;
Schneider on Workmen's Cmnpensation ( 2d Ed.)
~ec. 265
Numerous authorities can be found cited in the
following A. L. R. Annotations: 10 A. L. R. 169; 21 A. L.
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R. 1223; 24 A. L. R. 1233; 62 A. L. R. 1438; 145 A. L. R.
1033.
A case recently decided by the Supreme Court of
this Sta:te involved a similar situation ~o the one presented in the instant matter. In the case of London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Frazee (Utah, 1947), 185 Pac.
(2d) 284, the Court was concerned with the status of
one Frazee during the time he was being transported
over his employer's railway line from his home to his
place of employment. The transportation was furnished
free of charge, but the employee was not paid for the
time involved. The Court, in concluding that the relationship of employer and employee existed from the
time the employee boarded the employer's conveyance,
stated:

''An arrangement whereby the employer
agrees to have the employment commence at the
time employee boards the train may be unusual,
but. it is not so unusual as to be impossible of belief, even though the employee has no duties to
perform, can select another means of conveyance,
is not paid f.or his time spent in re turning horne
from the job, is riding a regularly seheduled
passenger train, i's tpaid by the month, and is
riding on a pass. All of these elements have a
bearing on the construc!tion of the contract of
employment. They are elements which can he considered in determining when the servant affix·ed
himself to his day's work.''
1

Applying the foregoing rules to the facts in the
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fore involve a question of law for this Court to pass
upon, the conclusion is inescapable that the decedent
was furnished transportation in connection with his
employment and as an incident thereof. During the
entire time that he had worked for· the defendant company he had had the use of a company vehicle to travel
from the job to his home in Springville and return.
When he was too far removed from home he did not
return every week-end; but on occasions when he did
return, the company paid his transportation back to
the job. The company at all times furnished a pickup
truck for the use of the superintendent, knew that he
used it for the purpose of transporting some employees,
and acquiesced therein.
Although there is evidence in the record that the
employees other than the foreman and superintendent
drove their own automobiles to the job, or obtained
other means of 'transportation for themselves, there is
no evidence that either the superintendent or the foreman at any time drove their own vehicles, but in all
instances except one used company transportation to
go to and from the job. The fact that the decedent was
a foreman or a superintendent at all times while he
worked for the company places him in a different category frmn the regular employees. As a supervisor he
was entitled to and did receive more consideration from
his employer. Since the employer left it to the discretion
of 'the superintendent as to how the cmnpany vehicle
would be used, and since the superintendent himself
stated that it was used for the purpose of transporting
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himse'lf and others to and from the job (and further
stated that on the day in question the use of the Studebaker automobile was given in order that he and Mr.
McKenzie rnight have a rneans of transportation from the
job to Springville, Utah), the evidence conclusively
establishes that the transportation furnished to the
superintendent and the foreman was incidental to their
employment, and that the relationship of employer and
employee existed while the decedent was traveling from
the job to his home in Springville.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion we submi't that the uncontradicted
evidence establishes: (1) that the decedent, Owen McKenzie did not seek permission to ride in the company
vehicle on the day in question from the Garland job to
his home in Springville, Utah, but that on the contrary,
such transportation was furnished t.o him by the company in accordance with the custom and practice, and
as a part of and incident to his employment with such
company; ( 2) that while the decedent was riding in the
company automobile fron1 the job to his home, the s'tatus
of employer and employee existed, so that the accident
which occurred on the trip homeward arose out of and
in the course of such employment.
Respectfully submitted,
McKAY, BURTON, NIELSEN
AND RICHARDS,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
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